Advanced Topics in Liberty
Public Choice and Government Failure
Conference for Students - November 9-11, 2012
Discussion Leader: Diana Thomas
Session 1: The Public Choice Approach
Buchanan, James M. The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan, Volume 1: The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Liberty. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, Inc., 1999. Chapter 2, “Politics Without Romance” (pages 45–59).
Brennan, Geoffrey and James M. Buchanan. “The Normative Purpose of Economic „Science‟: Rediscovery of an Eighteenth-Century Method.” International Review of Law and Economics 1, no. 2 (December 1981): 155–166. Entire article.
Session 2: Factions, Interest Groups, and Rent-Seeking
Carey, George W. and James McClellan, eds. The Federalist. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, Inc., 2001. Federalist Number 10 (pages 42–49).
Tullock, Gordon, Arthur Seldon, and Gordon L. Brady. Government Failure: A Primer on Public Choice. Washington: Cato Institute, 2002. Chapter 3, “Logrolling” (pages 29–41) and Chapter 4, “The Cost of Rent Seeking” (pages 43–51).
Wittman, Donald. The Myth of Democratic Failure: Why Political Institutions Are Efficient. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995, 1996. Chapter 4, “Transaction Costs and the Design of Government Institutions” (pages 31–37) and Chapter 7, “Pressure Groups” (pages 77–86).
Session 3: Economic Regulation and Budget Deficits
Stigler, George J. “The Theory of Economic Regulation.” The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2, no. 1 (Spring 1971): 3–21. Entire article.
Rowley, Charles K., eds. Democracy and Public Choice. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987. Chapter 20, Margaret A. Monaco and Charles K. Rowley‟s “A Political Economy of Budget Deficits” (pages 223–242).
Session 4: Redistributive Politics and the Welfare State
Wagner, Richard E. To Promote the General Welfare –– Market Processes vs. Political Transfers. San Francisco: Pacific Research Institute for Public Policy, 1989. Chapter 5, “Public Spending and Income Redistribution” (pages 89–106) and Chapter 8, “The Transfer Society and the Welfare State” (pages 155–178).
Session 5: Elections and the Problem of Voter Ignorance
Caplan, Bryan. The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007. Introduction, “The Paradox of Democracy” (pages 1–4) and Chapter 1, “Beyond the Miracle of Aggregation” (pages 5–22).
Pincione, Guido and Fernando Teson. Rational Choice and Democratic Deliberation. A Theory of Discourse Failure. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Selections from Chapter 2, “The Epistemic Argument for Deliberation” (pages 8–39).
Session 6: Constitutional Reform as a Light at the End of the Tunnel?
Buchanan, James M. and Geoffrey Brennan. The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan, Volume 10, The Reasons of Rules: Constitutional Political Economy. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, Inc., 2000. Chapter 9, “Is Constitutional Revolution Possible in Democracy?” (pages 149–167).
Grossman, Herschel I. “The state: Agent or proprietor?” Economics of Governance 1 (2000): 3–11. Entire article.