Advanced Topics in Liberty
Growth of Government
Conference for Students - September 28-30, 2012
Discussion Leader: Michael Munger
Session 1: Why the Growth of Government?
Higgs, Robert. Crisis and Leviathan: Critical Episodes in the Growth of American Government. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987. Part I, Chapter 1, “The Sources of Big Government: A Critical Survey of Hypotheses” (pages 3–19).
Seldon, Arthur. The Collected Works of Arthur Seldon, Volume V: Government Failure and Over-Government. Edited by Colin Robinson. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, Inc., 2005. Chapter 2, “The Debilitating Disease of Over-Government” (pages 101–115).
Session 2: Ideology and Government Growth
Hayek, F.A. The Collected Works of F.A. Hayek: Socialism and War: Essays, Documents, Reviews. Edited by Bruce Caldwell. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, Inc., 1997. Chapter 11, “The Intellectuals and Socialism” (pages 221–237).
Caplan, Bryan. “Libertarianism Against Economism: How Economists Misunderstand Voters and Why Libertarians Should Care.” Independent Review (Spring 2001): 539–563. Entire Article.
Session 3: The Role of Economic Crises
Higgs, Robert. Crisis and Leviathan: Critical Episodes in the Growth of American Government. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987. Chapter 8, “The Great Depression: „An Emergency More Serious Than War‟” (pages 159–195).
Session 4: Technology and Redistributive Politics
Cowen, Tyler. “Does Technology Drive The Growth of Government?” Mont Pelerin Society Meeting, Sweden, June 22, 2009. Entire paper.
de Jasay, Anthony. The State. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1998. Selections from Chapter 4, “Redistribution”: “Churning” (pages 254–263) and “Towards a Theory of the State” (pages 263–273).
Session 5: Is There a Case for Big Government?
Madrick, Jeff. The Case for Big Government. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010. Part I, “Government and Change in America” (pages 1–63).
Session 6: Limiting the Growth of Government
Krol, Robert. “The Role of Fiscal and Political Institutions in Limiting the Size of State Government.” Cato Journal 27, no. 3 (Fall 2007): 431–445. Entire article.
Buchanan, James M. and Geoffrey Brennan. The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan, Volume 10, The Reasons of Rules: Constitutional Political Economy. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, Inc., 2000. Chapter 9, “Is Constitutional Revolution Possible in Democracy?” (pages 149–167).